Monday, December 8, 2014

Winners & Losers

Throughout the term, there has been a consistent theme in our discussions: with a macroeconomic change, there will be winners and there will be losers. Initially we talked about this concept on a broader scope and reviewed Wolf and Stiglitz's perception of the win/loss relationship as it relates to globalization. Wolf acknowledges that some developing countries have not exactly benefitted from globalization, but reminds readers to reflect on the worse conditions in the past. Globalization, however, is not the only political/ economic trend producing winners and losers. In fact, I've applied this concept to a majority of current events/ news articles, and expanded upon the idea by constantly asking "what if" or questioning "the other side".

The plummeting price of oil is a current and perfect example of winners and losers resulting from an economic change. Obviously, oil importers see this as a positive opportunity, while exporters mourn over lost profit. Importers=winners, exporters=losers. The question: which effect is stronger? Will this result in a global net gain or loss? I came across an article in the Wall Street Journal that outlined the win/ loss relationship in the oil price drop, and even offered a hypothesis to my question.
While most oil price drops have been associated with economic downturns and recession, economists are saying that this time is different. According to IMF MD Christine Lagarde, "There will be winners and losers, but on a net-to-net basis, it's good news for the global economy." Researchers estimate that the price decline could add almost 1 percentage point to global growth over the next 2 quarters. The picture below quantifies the wins and losses...



I'm still not fully convinced: if oil price declines have been associated with economic downturns in the past, then why is this time so different? The article says, "part of the boost comes from lower transportation and manufacturing costs, particularly for energy-intensive industries such as airlines and steelmaking. The primary benefit is more cash in consumers' wallets as they spend less of their paychecks fueling their vehicles, spurring more consumer spending." This makes sense, but I don't see how this is different than previous major oil price declines; wouldn't a boost in consumer spending happen every time? The Wall Street Journal explained that the difference partially results from the supply/ demand ratio for oil, with a higher percentage attributed to supply causes. However, JP Morgan predicts a much narrower margin, or lower ratio, between the two causes, suggesting uncertainty in the accuracy of this ratio. Also, as Rosenberg explained, one reason the US is having trouble reaching the inflation target is because of the falling commodity prices. The world is experiencing slow growth, with continued deflationary pressures in Europe, Japan in a recession and loosened monetary policy in China in response to its "worrisome" slow growth in the 3rd quarter. While I want to be optimistic about the global impact of oil price declines, I can't help but to be curious. I wonder if maybe this growth statistic is overstated, shielding us from the overall weak global economic conditions and issues, especially in key regions/nations, and from historical trends in oil price drops/economic downturns. We've heard on numerous accounts that deflation should be treated as vigorously as inflation, and these oil prices reflect global deflationary trends. So, how optimistic should we be? Why are we ignoring the past?  In the words of Richard Clarida, "The US is the best student in a very mediocre class."



Wednesday, December 3, 2014

WTO Conference Lexington, 2014: On Behalf of the World Bank Group

To begin, I’d like to highlight some of the World Bank Group’s most recent successes in nations and regions present at the Whirled Trade Organization’s Lexington Round Meetings:
  • As of November 2014, the Bank’s $180 million IBRD infrastructure loan to four cities in China significantly strengthened the capacity for urban planning to create a better urban environment for more than 3 million people.
  • In June, a $100 million Floods Emergency Recovery Project was approved to aid those most affected by the worst flooding recorded in history in Bosnia.
  • Over past two decades, the World Bank has contributed over $1.4 billion in financing for rural water supply and sanitation in India, and about 24 million people in have benefited from these programs.
  • In Brazil, the World Bank has given technical and financial support to a program reaching 13 million impoverished families who have never benefited from social programs.
  • The World Bank's, more specifically the IDA’s, largest contributions lie in the African Union. The IDA’s chief goal is poverty reduction by providing concessional loans and grants to programs that boost economic growth and ultimately improve living conditions. Between 2003-2013, the IDA provided $66 billion in financing for projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and between 2005 and 2008, the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day fell by 9 million. [1]

This worker takes a break from weeding peppers on Sudo Forto's farm. Since receiving assistance from the World Bank in 2010, Forto has expanded his operations and hopes to employee more people soon. (Bosnia)

Newly constructed sewer interceptors and pipelines along the Jinsha River  (China)



 As a representative of The World Bank Group, I would like to speak on behalf of the International Development Association (IDA), the sector of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest countries. To be eligible for such funds, countries must meet the following criteria: 1) Relative poverty defined at GNI per capita $1,215 or below (2015), 2) Lack creditworthiness to borrow on market terms [1]. To put definitions in perspective, the US’s most recent GNI per capita measure stands at $53,960. While the IDA processes are important to understanding the branch’s functionality, in the interest of timing and objectives, I will not go into great detail. Rather, I would like to address points III and IV on the WTO agenda.

The IDA and World Bank agree that NTBs, especially in the areas of agriculture, that are prohibited include those technical trade barriers that are not demonstrated to be unsafe for human consumption. I’d like to reiterate the conditions of those least developed countries, which have limited capital and resources, and furthermore are unable to repay loans with near-zero interest rates. According to research done by the WTO in 2002, unfair First World (trade) barriers have cost developing countries US$700 billion a year in lost export earnings [5]. Unfair restrictions qualify as those products that are not fully proven to be unsafe. Trade restrictions like these are disadvantageous to developing countries because these barriers are frequently applied to products where developing countries have a comparative advantage, such as agriculture. The process behind deeming products unsafe remains somewhat ambiguous, and perhaps requires a more leveled, transparent method. If these discriminations are unmanaged or unrestricted, the World Bank will be hindered from reaching its main goal of extreme poverty reduction.

Regarding point IV, my initial concern results from the wording of the statement. While it reads, “no member nation shall provide direct subsidies or financial support…”, I would like to establish and ensure that this will not extend to aid and development institutions such as the World Bank. Concerning the vague statement “financial support”, the World Bank’s capital consists of reserves built and money paid from 188 of member country shareholders. The IDA’s funds are replenished every three years by 40 donor countries [1]. Most importantly, I’d like to clarify that this “financial support” is not misinterpreted to include the donations made by the World Bank’s shareholders and donors, since they are in fact, “nations”.  In closing, the World Bank would like to stress that its main objectives should be highlighted and kept in mind by all member nations: to end extreme poverty and decrease “the percentage of people living with less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3 percent globally by 2030”, and to “foster income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population in every country”. [1]



Annotated Bibliography: 
The World Bank’s website provides the objectives for each branch of the bank, and results for each region. I used this to search projects and results for each region or nation.

2. Tutwiler, M. Ann & Straub, M., “Making Agricultural Trade Reform Work for the Poor”, International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council, 2005.

This source focuses on the World Bank’s ultimate goal of poverty alleviation by specifically addressing agricultural trade. While the authors acknowledge that aid alone cannot bring development and full poverty reduction for developing countries, they stress the need to eliminate non-tariff trade barriers in agricultural trade. Both developed and developing countries must eliminate these trade barriers.

Concluding quote: “To ensure that trade reform is pro-poor, the key is not to seek additional exemptions from trade disciplines for developing countries, but to ensure that the WTO agreement is strong and effective in disciplining subsidies and reducing barriers to trade by all countries.”

3. NON-TARIFF MEASURES TO TRADE: Economic and Policy Issues
for Developing Countries
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE STUDIES, United Nations Publication, 2013.

This publication summarizes the impacts of non-tariff trade barriers in trade liberalization. It provides definitions to relative terms (NTBs), their basic framework and more importantly, the implications of NTBs between developing countries.

4. Mold, Andrew. “Non-Tariff Barriers – Their Prevalence and Relevance for African Countries”, African Trade Policy Centre, 2005.

This article provides a case study for the implications of NTBs on low-developed countries. According to their research, NTBs is a prevalent inter-regional problem. I plan to use this publication to discuss the impacts of NTBs established by industrialized countries on LDCs (in Africa) and the impacts of NTBs within a region of LDCs.
Quote: “Finally, African countries are not only victims of the growing prevalence of NTBs – they are also prone to using NTBs themselves to keep out exports of other African countries. The paper argues that African countries apply NTBs in a way that deeply damages the prospects for intra-regional trade.”

5. World Trade Organization, “Trade liberalisation statistics.”

This summarizes research done by the World Trade Organization. It includes the World Bank as a primary source. According to a world bank study, the elimination of FW-favoring trade barriers systematically approved by us would lift 300 million people out of poverty. An extension of World Bank research, in relation to this article, can be found at:

6. The World Bank, “Knowledge in Development Note: Trade for Development, 2009.

This goes into more detail/ examples about the implications of unfair trade restrictions imposed on developing countries.
“Moreover, an anti-agricultural bias prevails in the sense that if all goods markets globally were freed up, agricultural value added in developing countries would not only increase absolutely, but also relative to non-agricultural GDP. Since most of the poor in the world are developing country farmers, such a move would be a major contribution to poverty reduction globally.”


Wednesday, November 19, 2014

Saving the Planet: Is it a global priority?



I've taken three environmental courses in my college career (not necessarily by choice) and not once have I felt scared or worried upon completing the course. Professors don't make it their goal to scare students into thinking that we are doomed from global warming. It's true, 95% of scientists agree that global warming is a real concern. Not only are there so many factors to consider, but these environmental processes are offered on extreme timescales. It may seem selfish, but I tend to consider the timescales that affect me, my family, my friends and anyone in the present, and even my future family. Because global climate change is such an extended process, with so much uncertainty, it is often difficult to really become frightened by this phenomenon.


I have no intentions of belittling the issue of global warming. However, I think it is ironic and interesting, especially after Tuesday's readings, to point out that Australia did not even want to include climate change on the G-20 agenda. A recent article on the summit wrote, 


"Asked on Sunday if he accepted the climate change was potentially one of the biggest impediments to global economic growth, Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey said: "No. No I don't. Absolutely not."
"You just look at China. China is going to continue to increase emissions to 2030," he said. "Australia is doing the same amount of work on climate change as the United States over a 30-year period. Frankly, what we're focused on is growth and jobs."

Despite Australia PM Tony Abbott's efforts, climate change was put on the agenda. To think it sparked debate makes me wonder how much climate change is prioritized in the international political economy. I feel like it's something that is always squeezed behind monetary policy, trade, tax reform, etc. talks. In other words, how important is this topic in comparison to the other factors considered in economic growth? Because the timeframe for climate change, especially globally, is so large, I, along with Abbott, am skeptical about its place in comparatively short-term economic planning. The effects of fluctuations in the economy are often more tangible and immediate than large-scale climate changes, making people respond more sensitively to factors impacting the economy. If someone loses their job, what will MOST immediately prioritize: how to get back on their feet and back into the job market, or how to stop the factory next-door from environmentally harmful emission practices? I think a similar mindset applies on a global scale. 

According to the SMH, "G20 summit concluded on Sunday with agreements to close tax loopholes used by multinationals, improve trade, encourage the setting of early emissions reduction targets, strengthen banks, reform energy markets including gas, and coordinate a stronger response to the Ebola epidemic."

Stiglitz would respond to Australia's proposal with disdain, but would be happy to see that climate change action ultimately prevailed. After spending a fair amount of time criticizing the US for refusing to comply with global climate change initiatives, including the Kyoto Protocol, Stiglitz offers several suggestions towards prioritizing the planet during the ongoing globalization process. As a world leader and contributing polluter, Stiglitz expresses the need for the US "to make small expenditures in order to reduce risks of much larger expenditures down the line" (185). He argues that  we can afford it, and by not taking action, we are hurting the rest of the world by evading responsibility and setting a poor example, especially for developing countries. Inflation targets are one solution that Stiglitz offered for the climate change issue. If this isn't enough, he provides an alternative approach based on system of "sticks over carrots", or punishments to deter environmentally threatening practices in relevant industries. I guess the next step is to wait and see how well major polluters and G20 participants actually respond to the emission reduction targets...

Tuesday, November 18, 2014

G-20 Summit: Is the environment a priority?

U.S., EU override Australia to put climate change on G20 agenda

Asked on Sunday if he accepted that climate change was potentially one of the biggest impediments to global economic growth, Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey said: "No. No I don't. Absolutely not."
"You just look at China. China is going to continue to increase emissions to 2030," he said. "Australia is doing the same amount of work on climate change as the United States over a 30-year period. Frankly, what we're focused on is growth and jobs."
A post with my reactions to follow...

Wednesday, November 12, 2014

6 Banks Fined Over $4.3bill for Foreign-Exchange Manipulation

Currencies Settlement Is Latest to Ensnare Banks

I am wondering how several of our authors are responding to Wall Street's latest mishap. Six banks- Citi, JP Morgan, UBS, RBS, HSBC and Bank of America- are paying a total of $4.3 billion to US, UK and Swiss regulators to resolve allegations of manipulating the foreign-exhcnage market. Why did banks do this? BBC most clearly explains, "traders attempted to manipulate the relevant currency rate in the market, for example to ensure that the rate at which the bank had agreed to sell a particular currency to its clients was higher than the average rate it had bought the currency. If successful, the bank would profit."  Financial penalties are nothing new for these firms, who have racked up over $200 bill in penalties for interest rate manipulation, sanctions violations and "improperly selling a variety of financial products." Manipulation isn't a new concept either (let's not forget the housing crisis). After reading The Big Short and capturing Lewis's cynical view of Wall Street, I'm sure he is nothing less than surprised. In his book, he continuously points fingers at the Investment Banks for their manipulation in mortgage bond structuring. In Krugman's final chapters he addresses the need for heavy regulation of both the investment and shadowing banking systems. He'd probably say, "another example of the need to regulate banks (of both kinds)." After reading Lewis's book, I'd have to agree with this system of sticks. If the housing crisis wasn't enough, banks should be regulated and otherwise penalized for manipulative actions. However, I have to wonder, with such extensive internal/ external regulation, compliance and risk management departments at these banks, how do traders continue to get away with this?


Monday, November 10, 2014

Quick Recap: Eric Rosengren



"The Federal Reserve must respond as vigorously to inflation that is too low as we have, historically, when inflation has been too high."
"Policymakers should remain patient about removing accommodation until it is clear that we are on the path to achieving [our] 2% inflation target..."- Eric Rosengren 

President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Eric Rosengren gave a rather short presentation tonight on the implications of low inflation. His main point: the Fed needs to respond to inflation that is too low as forcefully as it would to inflation that is too high. Rosengren's main concern is the current US inflation rate, which stands below the Fed's 2% target. With interest rates remaining near zero after QE, another obstacle for the Fed is deciding when to start raising rates to a more normal level.  Rosengren suggests that the Fed should be patient in the process of raising interest rates until inflation reaches a level closer, or at 2%. Why is it so hard to raise inflation rates right now? According to Rosengren, major factors are the general fall in commodity prices, including oil and agriculture and the appreciating dollar. Rosengren used Japan and Europe as examples of the risks of letting inflation rates slip, leading to deflationary responses in the economy. This contributes to another concern: the Fed's loss of creditability from its inability to reach its target rate, ultimately lowering consumer and producer expectations.  After using graphical evidence to present the association between high unemployment/ lower inflation (low unemployment/ higher inflation), Rosengren expressed his goal of reaching an even lower unemployment rate of 5.25% (in comparison to the current 5.8%).

Rosengren's talk was more informative than provocative. The talk was very relevant to class material and I enjoyed hearing his summary and "safe" opinions on issues in current monetary policy.  If you missed it, revisit The Economist article we read a few weeks ago - it overlaps with many of Rosengren's points about the dangers low inflation.

Wednesday, November 5, 2014

Reflection on Michael Lewis's The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine


(Note: Relevant article at the end)

If you’re looking for a textbook, definitional account of the Financial Crisis, this is not the book for you. Rather, Michael Lewis describes the onset of the housing bubble and eventual crash using a dry-humored, story-like style. His book is both entertaining and informative, especially for those (like me) who lack extensive background in the development of the housing bubble. By telling the stories of a few men who recognized the failure of the subprime mortgage bond market before it happened, Lewis explains how subprime lending worked and why the market essentially failed.

The Wall Street “big shots” like Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bear Sterns, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan found themselves in the midst of a booming mortgage bond market that took off in the 1980s. Mortgage bonds, as Lewis describes, were “a claim on the cash flows from a pool of thousands of individual home mortgages” (7). Investment banks structured mortgage bonds by “tranches.” The lowest tranches were more risky, with higher interest rates, while higher tranches had lower interest rates and lower risk. Subprime lending began as lenders disregarded the fact that a low credit scored- borrower may not be able to make mortgage payments, because as home prices kept rising, borrowers could just pay off the mortgage by selling the house. As subprime mortgages became packaged into bonds, investors relied on Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings to make their investment decisions, where riskier mortgage bonds would receive lower ratings. Lewis, however, highlights a botch in the rating system, found in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). AIG insured CDOs, which “disguise the risk of subprime mortgage loans,” by packaging them with “better loans,” ultimately allowing them to receive a better rating (72). Stephen Eisman, Michael Burry, Jamie Mai and Charlie Ledley not only recognized this “ponzi scheme,” but they took advantage of it.

Lewis introduces Michael Burry, a neurosurgeon with Asperger’s who was fascinated by the bond market, specifically the subprime mortgage boom. Burry watched the housing bubble grow, leading to his discovery and purchase of credit default swaps (CDS)- “insurance against the failure of a mortgage bond” (72).  Eisman, a fickle and hotheaded hedge fund owner, saw disaster coming when Wall Street banks’ fixed-income departments would package mortgage loans with “teaser” fixed interest rates into mortgage bonds. He saw the rating inefficiencies and the potential for profits by betting against (“shorting”) the bonds with the worst underlying loans.  Ledley and Mai started Cornwall Capital Management and executed investments based on predicted failures in certain markets. After getting placed on Deustche Bank’s “institutional” trading platform, they bet against (bought CDS) CDOs. By 2007, as defaults rose and CDOs began to fail in large numbers, Burry and Cornwall Capital sold their credit default swaps and heavily profited. The subprime mortgage- backed financial system collapsed as housing prices fell and borrowers defaulted on their loans, bringing a series of bankruptcies and acquisitions on Wall Street. Lewis ends with the startling statistics, including the Fed’s announcement of a $85 billion towards AIG to pay off its losses on the CDS sold to Wall Street.

I’ll start with what I liked. I liked that Lewis used his book to describe the Financial Crisis from a rare point of view; “rare” based on the fact that he followed those few who predicted and benefited from this economic catastrophe. Instead of saying “This is how the housing bubble started, this is why it was bad,” Lewis takes a journalistic approach (appropriate since he is a financial journalist) and includes quotes and thoughts that these financial geniuses had as they watched the housing bubble expand and pop. For example, Lewis quotes Ledley in his discovery of the botched rating system, “The more we looked at what a CDO was, the more we were like, Holy shit, that’s just fucking crazy. That’s fraud (129). By including actual quotes and reactions of the “winners” in his book, Lewis depicts their personalities and their ability to analyze a complex situation.  Including the fascinating stories behind his core characters, like Murry’s battle with Asperger’s, made learning about the subprime mortgage crisis more personal, enjoyable and overall, readable. The insertion of the “F Bomb” throughout the book made it feel like I was hearing a real conversation between Wall Street honchos and big-time money managers.

While the writing style and context of the book encouraged me to read more Michael Lewis books (next on my list is Panic!), I’m somewhat uncomfortable with his portrayal of these figures as “heroes.” Eisman, Murry and the Cornwall brothers saw an opportunity and seized it. When I was little, I had 10 pennies and gave my younger brother a proposition: “I will trade you ALL of these pennies for that ONE, single dollar bill.” Naively, he thought he struck gold. Does the recognition of an opportunity for personal gain (and his loss) make me a hero? Yes, the housing crisis is far more complex, dealing with numerous additional variables. The point is, the characters in this book also recognized opportunity and seized it. Regardless of their gain, thousands suffered from substantial losses (on the lending and borrowing side). They benefited while everyone else suffered. This, in my opinion, may make Eisman, Murry, Ledley and Mai clever, observant and financially talented—not  heroic.

Lewis acknowledges the weaknesses in rating agencies, but for me, not enough. He constantly points back to Wall Street and the big banks, the investors and manipulation in bond structuring. According to Lewis, Wall Street firms were able “to hide the risk by complicating it.” He includes an interaction between Eisman’s partner and a woman from Moody’s: “How could you rate any portion of a bond made up exclusively of subprime mortgages triple-A?” asked Eisman’s partner. The Moody’s rep responded, “That’s a very good question” (103). Lewis used this to point out that the banks convoluted the structure of subprime mortgage bonds to facilitate more investment. However, reading this made me attribute a large part of the blame to the rating agencies themselves. They have the responsibility of evaluating and reviewing bonds in order to designate a specific rating, meaning they should have reviewed all loans within the bonds thoroughly. So, while I agree that the banks were manipulative in their structuring of the CDOs, Moody’s and S&P are also a large part of the issue.

Reading The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine was both critical in my understanding of the development of the housing crisis and towards my ability to develop an opinion of those directly involved. Prior to this book, I have not considered the position of the rating agencies, who I now think play a substantial role in the mismanagement and mistakes behind CDOs and faults within the subprime mortgage market. Lewis took a darker view of Wall Street, opening his book with discouraging words about working in finance and banking. While I acknowledge that he is far more experienced than I am, I cannot completely agree with the representation of his characters as “heroic” based on the fact that they foresaw the explosion of the housing bubble and used this to reap profits. As far as designating a victim, I still go back and forth between investors and borrowers. Lewis presents his characters as sympathetic to the borrowers. Personally, I can’t help but to feel that both the investors and the borrowers acted without thinking in the long term. 

Recent and relevant article about AIG: Former CEO Hank Greenberg files a lawsuit against the US Government for 'overstepping its authority in demanding a 79.9% equity stake in exchange for providing an $85 billion emergency loan." ....Mr. Greenberg, you accepted the bailout package and you needed it. There's no such thing as a free lunch. 




Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Brazil in the News

http://online.wsj.com/articles/brazils-currency-shares-slump-on-rousseff-re-election-1414413609

After discussing and reading about financial panics and the economic consequences of loss of confidence, I thought I'd blog about Brazil's buzz in the news. President Dilma Rousseff's re-election has created pessimistic reactions, socially and economically (this article covers reactions over social media, especially Facebook, possibly contributing to Facebook's increased stock price: http://online.wsj.com/articles/after-vote-brazilians-lash-out-on-social-media-1414443541). 

Economically, investors are reluctant and skeptical about Rousseff's capabilities and plans to pull Brazil out of its slump. This lack of confidence and skepticism is reflected in the devaluation of its currency and its expectation for slow growth (less that 0.5% according to this article). Although Rousseff promises reform, investors are still not quite confident that she can sustain these promises.  Going off of Chang's piece, it seems that investors are showing broader feelings of "bad policy." It seems that they are holding expectations of poor policy initiatives carried over from Rousseff's previous term. According to the article, the only way to "calm" these concerns and further calm the markets is to "quickly name a new economic team, including a finance minister who can reassure investors that the country’s fiscal situation is under control." The problem: empty promises. What are the global implications? Well, if there is loss of confidence internally, especially with quantitative evidence like currency and poor growth statistics, then external confidence probably won't be strong either, discouraging foreign investment. Maybe this devaluation can encourage some export promotion, but for now it looks like the government needs to get moving on these promises, before every Facebook status sh*ts on them.  

Monday, October 13, 2014

China is still planned, but what's next?

Looking back at our discussion from Day 3, we summarized that Wolf and Stiglitz have two different perceptions on the reasons behind China's success. Wolf, with his push for unfettered, liberal globalization, argues that China's economic growth has stemmed from its movement towards more liberal policies, ultimately fostering more growth. Stiglitz, who advocates for a more highly regulated globalization process, would agree that China has opened its economy, but it has done so slowly, and is still classified as a highly planned economy. Alon et. al's piece reminded me of this distinction between previous authors. This Economic Letter acknowledges China's increased foreign investment with the goal of accessing resources (natural), technology and capital inputs. China's growth, along with this pattern, according these authors, suggests that the country will continue to expand in hopes of continuing their growth spurt. This piece also mentions, on several occasions, the state's involvement in investments. On the one hand, between the 1960-2008, China accumulated financial wealth and relaxed restrictions on outflow. Alon et. al writes, "Nevertheless, despite Chinese reforms over the last decade that removed bans on foreign direct investment by the country’s private sector, most outward direct investment during this period was conducted by state-owned or quasi-state-owned firms." Ending here, one could argue that it backs Stiglitz's argument: that although China has liberalized in some aspects, the economy is still largely state-owned, contributing to its expansion. Reading on, the article names 2 motivations that Chinese banks have for seeking a broader international role, both of which deal with the banks looking for ways to develop and escape strict controls ("China’s strict controls on international capital flows and foreign exchange transactions have prompted Chinese banks to look for ways to get around these restrictions"). So, the question remains: what has had a larger impact on China's economic growth? Further, will the state continue to control outward investment, or will Chinese banks push for a more liberalized process?

Tuesday, September 30, 2014

Milner's Power of Values & the Asian Values Argument

Milner's piece "IPE: Beyond Hegemonic Stability" examines a number of explanatory factors and propositions behind states' actions within the International Political Economy. His section on "the power of values" offers the idea that the social construction of states' identities constrains the choices the states make and pushes them towards certain behaviors. This concept relates to one argument that I have visited in a few of my politics papers- the "Asian Values" argument. According to this argument, Asian values promote “consensus, harmony, unity and community [as] the essence of Asian culture and identity” which conflict with general Western values like “absence of consensus, conflict, disunity, and individualism” (Hoon). The argument supports Milner's point that typical asian values are often integrated into governmental decisions and rhetoric. The conflict between Western and Asian values causes anti-western sentiments within the region and are also a basis for political and regional connections between Asian countries. Milner's Japan/Pacifism example is somewhat similar to the asian values argument, as both could be motivations for less integration into the international economy.  However, this notion of nonmaterial influences may not be as significant, or can even stem from Milner's third point, the influence of domestic politics on the IPE.