Milner's Power of Values & the Asian Values Argument

Milner's piece "IPE: Beyond Hegemonic Stability" examines a number of explanatory factors and propositions behind states' actions within the International Political Economy. His section on "the power of values" offers the idea that the social construction of states' identities constrains the choices the states make and pushes them towards certain behaviors. This concept relates to one argument that I have visited in a few of my politics papers- the "Asian Values" argument. According to this argument, Asian values promote “consensus, harmony, unity and community [as] the essence of Asian culture and identity” which conflict with general Western values like “absence of consensus, conflict, disunity, and individualism” (Hoon). The argument supports Milner's point that typical asian values are often integrated into governmental decisions and rhetoric. The conflict between Western and Asian values causes anti-western sentiments within the region and are also a basis for political and regional connections between Asian countries. Milner's Japan/Pacifism example is somewhat similar to the asian values argument, as both could be motivations for less integration into the international economy.  However, this notion of nonmaterial influences may not be as significant, or can even stem from Milner's third point, the influence of domestic politics on the IPE.

Is the US all to Blame?

Many of Stiglitz's comments are uncontroversial- there is a clear imbalance in the international economic system and this progression towards balancing is not easy nor quick. While he acknowledges the grand potential of globalization, he continuously mentions the mismanagement behind the current international economic system. His main concern is the self-interested actions of the developed world that unfairly leads to asymmetric globalization. Lack of transparency, one-sided economic policies in developed counties, and leverage imbalances in the international financial systems all fall into this "asymmetric" category. Stiglitz, to no surprise, consistently points fingers at the U.S. and the E.U. as primary examples of leaders who are have shaped the international economy based on self-interested policies. One of my Australian professors would be the first to agree with Stiglitz, as he never forgot to glance at me when he mentioned the U.S.'s competitive mindset within the international community. Although quite realist, I do not disagree with Stiglitz on this front. If there is opportunity, a country/person/group, etc. will naturally seize it. However, one thing that Stiglitz shies away from are the internal political foundations within the developing world. While much of his blame points towards the inactions or mismanagement of the global economic leaders, Stiglitz tends to avoid discussing the disfunction incited by some of the LDCs' governments. Maybe that is next on Stiglitz's agenda, but for now, he is short of acknowledging the role of the political corruption in global imbalances and is persistent in his argument for the faults of developed countries. As Wolf summarizes, "Movement of people and trade in the labour services are, in the present circumstances, probably the best thing one could do for the poor of the world. But the political obstacles are mountainous."

A Question for Wolf

Leading up to Chapter 8, I had a general understanding of the direction in which Wolf was going. After defining his objectives and presenting the counter-arguments, Wolf touches on the fall of liberalism, specifically in the first half of the 19th century. While the later collapse of the Soviet Union may have discouraged an inward, planned economy, he emphasizes the role of Nationalism in the so-called "death of liberalism". In Chapter 7, as we discussed in class Tuesday, the question that emerges is: What drives economic liberalization? While technology, including the spread of, remains a common answer, Wolf mentions the role of policy and political institutions. In his view, governments must provide policies that allows their economies to reap the benefits of economic integration. In congruence to this he writes, "Opportunities do not create wealth. Only seizing them does." Putting this together, it seems that Wolf is implying that wealth, or economic growth, starts with the government's decision to institute policies that comply with liberalism (i.e. openness to trade, free market). He concludes Chapter 8 by saying, "high-income countries/ inflict substantial harm on developing countries. The high income-countries also operate tight controls on inflows of immigrants" (which he earlier associates with Nationalism, especially regarding social security advantages). So, my question for Wolf would be, if liberalization helps a country become high-income, but Nationalism is an ideology that has lead to the "death" of liberalism, then can this initial liberalization actually lead to a fall in globalization by cutting off the developing world?